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Abstract and Keywords
This chapter argues that whereas perceptual experience is underconstant in one 
sense, it is virtually constant insofar as it is functionally stable and predictable. 
The possibility of distinguishing perception and cognition is explored in 
experiments on the perception of surface orientation. These experiments are 
related to the study of self-motion perception and space perception. An 
experiment comparing monocular and binocular perception of hills revealed 
perceptual differences, between-subjects, that were masked in within-subject 
comparisons by metacognitive strategies. A second experiment found that 
participants wearing heavy backpacks gave (cognitively) elevated slope 
estimates only because of experimental demands not physical ones. Perceptual 
experience is informative about perceptual processing, but reports of experience 
are subject to cognitive contamination. True perceptual experience may be 
virtually constant insofar as the perceptual consequences of actions can be 
correctly anticipated.
Keywords:   perceptual experience, cognition, monocular perception, binocular perception, 
metacognition, cognitive contamination
When humans walk through a fixed environment they experience that 
environment as stationary and stable. Yet at the same time they may be aware of 
the optic flow of the objects and walls around them. This awareness of motion 
superimposed on a stable world might be compared to the awareness of 
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shadows or other gradients of light cast upon a surface that nonetheless appears 
uniform in color: We know that we are the source of the motion, just as we know 
that illumination changes are the sources of shadows. But awareness of optic 
flow might alternatively be compared to the awareness of converging lines in a 
hallway whose walls nonetheless appear parallel. We do know that the perceived 
optic flow rate during self-motion is much reduced compared to how the same 
relative flow rate would be experienced when standing still (Durgin et al. 2005). 
That is, “retinal” properties of flow are lost during self-motion (like “retinal” size 
and color are unrecoverable). Thus, our perceptual experience seems to include 
only the shadows of underconstancy, which may often be corrected for in 
judgment by metacognitive awareness (Granrud 2009).
A primary thesis of this chapter is that this state of affairs (systematic 
underconstancy) may be no accident if our perceptual experience needs to 
retain the structured correlations among perceptual and motor variables that 
can most effectively control and guide our actions. Whereas Noë (2004) suggests 
that perceptions of constancies, like surface color, emerge, Gibson-like, from the 
external predictability of the non-constant image transformations, he seems to 
assume that we have access to the undistorted retinal array. An alternative view 
is that we have partial constancy in our immediate perceptual experience and 
that virtual constancy and stability can be achieved insofar as the perceptual 
predictions we can make about the consequences of our actions are accurate. 
That is, virtual perceptual constancy is achieved insofar as we can predict how 
our (non-constant) perceptions will be modified as we move our bodies (e.g., 
down a hallway) or even as we move our attention.
Full perceptual constancy, on this account (e.g., not being able to see optic flow 
at all) might be disastrous. For example, when we move, objects that we pass 
rotate with respect to our reference frame, but Wallach et al. (1974) showed that 
during self-motion there is a huge drop in sensitivity to correlated object 
rotations (relative to an absolute reference  (p.88) frame). This is probably 
because precise predictions of object shear for stationary objects in the 
environment during self-motion would require a full and accurate coding of 
spatial layout, so it is probably more efficient to accept nearly whatever shear 
emerges during self-motion as consistent with a stable environment 
(discrimination is sacrificed for stability).
In contrast, Durgin and Gigone (2007) have shown that sensitivity to optic flow 
rates for highly predictable surfaces like the ground plane is enhanced during 
self-motion (for speeds in the range appropriate to walking, for example), 
consistent with the idea that predictability is fundamental: Retinal flow is 
distorted (consistent with partial constancy in the form of world stability), but 
the distortion produces a gain in sensitivity to information relevant to the 
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prediction of perceptual consequences of self-motion (Durgin 2009; see also 
Abrams et al. 2007). Partial constancy may thus provide a useful compromise.
A secondary thesis of this paper, however, is that perceptual experience, tainted 
and distorted as it may be, has a kind of stability and reliability that can seem to 
be falsified by incautious methods of measurement. Whereas the boundary 
between perception and judgment is never easy to define, there are contexts in 
which it is possible to distinguish between judgmental biases and perceptual 
ones. Finding ways to make these distinctions with greater certainty may not be 
easy but is important. Although the study of perceptual processing cannot be 
conducted reliably by introspection alone, neither should it be conducted as if 
introspection were impossible. The studies of perceived optic flow rate discussed 
above depended on several different forms of measurement including, 
importantly, magnitude estimation, which is a form of momentary introspection. 
But any particular measurement technique can introduce biases and confusions. 
For example, successive comparison of two stimuli may appear to be a fairly safe 
perceptual task, but judgments relative to an internal standard have been shown 
to be much more precise than perceptual comparisons of successively presented 
stimuli (Nachmias 2006). Even successive comparison involves memory and 
therefore the possibility of judgmental bias.
Here we consider some problems in the empirical conceptualization of 
perceptual experience using the perception of empty spatial extents and two 
studies of surface orientation as sample cases. We start with the idea that 
perceptual experience is not to be confused with perceptual information and 
then develop the idea that neither is it to be confused with perceptual 
judgments. We will return at the end to the possible relation between perceptual 
underconstancies and the kind of virtual perceptual constancy that successful 
perceptual prediction affords.
One depth doesn’t fit all
One preliminary point is that different sources of perceptual information may 
lead to different kinds of perceptual experience and that constancy of the sort 
we are discussing may fail when certain specific forms of information are absent. 
Some theories of cue combination suggest that when visual sources of 
information about depth can be integrated, they will be (e.g., Hillis et al. 2002), 
whereas cross-modal sensory experiences are  (p.89) not necessarily fused. 
Hillis et al. considered the fusion of stereoscopic information about surface slant 
with texture information about surface slant and contrasted it with haptic 
information about surface slant. There are, of course, cross-modal confusions. 
For example, many individuals report feeling the warmth of a bright laser 
pointer light shone on “their” hand (even though they are only viewing a light 
shown on a rubber hand that, by means of mirrors, appears in the location of 
their hand; Durgin et al. 2007a). In speech, most individuals report hearing “da” 
when seeing video of clearly separated lips pronouncing the syllable “ga” in 
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synchrony with a sound that normally sounds like “ba” (McGurk and MacDonald 
1976). If one assumes that perception is an attribution based on available 
evidence, it seems reasonable to assume that depth information provided by one 
rich (metric) source of visual information can be substituted for that produced 
by another. However, there appear to be strange incompatibilities between 
different sources of information about relative distance from the observer. 
Indeed, some of these incompatibilities lie within a given system.
For example, Mamassian (2008) has found that perceiving that a surface is 
slanted using binocular disparity is ten times harder (less sensitive) than 
perceiving a difference in depth between two surfaces—even though the 
stimulus information specifying the presence of slant and the difference in depth 
was identical in his stimuli. Perceived slant is simply a different feature than 
distance, which receives different information from disparity maps.
Whereas textbooks commonly suggest that motion parallax is a rich source of 
metric depth information (e.g., Wolfe et al. 2006), and there are even arguments 
that it is preferable on computational grounds (e.g., Richards 1985), the case of 
Stereo Sue (Sacks 2006) provides a hint that this is not reflected in perceptual 
experience. Susan Barry was born strabismic (cross-eyed) so that her eyes did 
not focus on the same place. Her vision in each eye was perfectly adequate, and 
her visual experience for most of her life alternated between her two eye views, 
with each eye image sometimes being the suppressed one. Because she never 
used her eyes in concert, she was stereoblind until in middle age she undertook 
vergence exercises that allowed her (eventually) to stop suppressing and use her 
two (now verged) eye images in conjunction with one another. Her case is 
already highly controversial, because of the widespread belief that unused 
stereo channels atrophy completely. Moreover, her subjective reports concerning 
the experiential difference between her new binocular perceptions and her 
former experience of the world has only increased the level of skepticism about 
her claims. This is because she suggested that, prior to gaining binocular vision, 
she had never experienced “depth,” by which she may mean the empty space 
between things. For most current theorists, this notion seems confused. Depth is 
depth, they argue, by whatever source. Such theorists accept that different 
sources of depth information may be more precise than others, but assume that 
all provide perceptual “depth.”
One specific example Sue gives is of seeing for the first time that trees contain a 
tangible volume of space (as opposed to merely a layered tangle of branches). 
The tree example seems telling because it is exactly the example used by Wolfe 
et al.’s (2006) excellent  (p.90) textbook when describing the richness of depth 
provided by motion parallax. Their textbook suggests that the student lie under 
a tree:
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Gaze up in the branches and leaves with one eye covered and your head 
stationary. You will notice that the leaves and branches form a relatively 
flat texture. You can see all the details, but you may have trouble deciding 
if one little branch lies in front of or behind another. If you open the other 
eye, stereopsis…will allow the branches and leaves to fill out a three- 
dimensional volume that was lacking before. Close the eye and the volume 
collapses. Now, move your head from side to side and motion parallax will 
restore the sense of depth.
(Wolfe et al. 2006, 137)
Although Wolfe et al. (2006) intend to portray motion parallax as equivalent to 
stereopsis, the choice of words here creates an appropriate contrast between 
them insofar as “the sense of depth” one gets from motion parallax sounds 
entirely inferior to the “three-dimensional volume” provided by stereopsis.
LeClair and Durgin (2008) compared metric depth interval estimation from 
motion parallax with that from binocular stereopsis. We suspended pairs of 
objects (“clouds” of polyester batting) at different locations within a well-lit, but 
featureless chamber 4 m deep and asked observers to estimate the true 
distances between the paired objects in one of three conditions:
Monocularly, with lateral head movements of twice the typical 
interpupillary distance (motion parallax);
Binocularly, without head movements (binocular stereopsis); or
Monocularly, without head movements (control).
The difference in subjective impressions for motion parallax and binocular 
conditions, consistent with the retrospective claims of Susan Barry, were 
reflected by depth interval estimates which were much less variable and much 
more accurate under static binocular viewing than with motion parallax. Indeed, 
although motion parallax reduced response variability relative to the control 
condition, the average estimates in the two monocular conditions were quite 
similar and were much less than the depth estimates given under binocular 
viewing. Our own subjective impression was that as we moved our head with 
only one eye open we saw the two objects slide back and forth with respect to 
each other, but we (like our naïve participants, apparently) experienced no sense 
of depth between them, only the sure knowledge that larger relative motions 
signaled larger separations in depth.
Our observation is not without precedent. Ono et al. (1986) noted that only in 
very near space of 30–80 cm do simulated motion parallax displays appear rigid 
(see also Nawrot 2003). But the more widely held view is the one presented in 
the textbook, that motion parallax provides all the information you need to get 
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metric depth. We do not deny that some motion parallax displays are incredibly 
compelling (especially those involving very near space), but we suspect that for 
normal large scale scenes, motion parallax can often seem impressively effective 
at capturing spatial layout primarily because the motion parallax gradient can 
be anchored to the ground plane—which has its own distance metric built into it 
(Beusmans 1998; Gibson 1950).
 (p.91) So does this support Stereo Sue’s assertion that depth from binocular 
disparity is qualitatively different than depth from other sources? Perhaps, but 
not convincingly. It remains reasonable, as in the cases examined by Mamassian 
(2008), to consider that the computations carried out on various kinds of 
theoretically useful information may lead to surprisingly divergent 
consequences. The fact that performance at our cloud task was so poor with 
motion parallax relative to performance with binocular stereopsis encourages 
the view (consistent with Mamassian’s observation) that binocular information is 
particularly good at representing the volumetric separations between surfaces 
whereas motion parallax is not particularly good at this—at a viewing distance 
exceeding a meter. But the striking failure of binocular slant perception in 
Mamassian’s special case is worth keeping in mind. It may be that even though 
spatial layout was evident to Susan Barry before she became Stereo Sue, there 
really was no perception of empty space. It was Gibson who suggested that there 
was no such thing as space perception—only the perception of surfaces. But the 
cloud study points to empty-space perception as an experiential reality that 
binocular vision may uniquely support but that is frequently supplemented by 
metacognition.
It remains possible that the vergence system itself plays an important role in 
this, but the main point is that the specific kind of volumetric experience that 
Wolfe et al. (2006) describe for the binocular view of trees (which goes beyond 
what vergence could possibly achieve) really may be something that can only be 
activated by binocular inputs or by other inputs (e.g., motion parallax in very 
near space) that have become appropriately linked to binocular inputs through 
experience. Sometimes different sources of information about surface layout 
may be overlaid rather than fused. We just don’t know enough yet to be sure. 
What we do know is that perceptual experience is not the same as perceptual 
information, and yet perceptual experience may have a lot to tell us about how 
perceptual information is processed. However, getting access to perceptual 
experience for objective measurement is not easy.
Experiment 1: When big effects have small consequences
One sub-goal in the experimental study of perceptual experience is for the 
experimenter to convince research participants simply to report their experience 
honestly. This should help make modeling perceptual experience possible. Some 
of us develop complicated instruction sets designed to encourage participants to 
appreciate that their reports are our only access to their subjective experiences 
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and emphasizing that it is those experiences that we want to measure. But there 
are times (unlike the cloud case above) when the perceptual reports that we 
collect are in striking variance with our own subjective impressions of how the 
stimulus appears. These moments can be quite frustrating, indeed—and all the 
more so because our participants are sometimes a little too clear that, despite 
their original promises to report things as they saw them, they could not 
overcome the desire to be right, the wish not to appear foolish. Granrud’s (2009) 
documentation of meta-perceptual awareness in children engaged in size 
estimation tasks is a striking example of how dual awareness is one of the facts 
of perceptual reports.
 (p.92) One of the fundamental principles of slope perception is known as the 
frontal tendency (Gibson 1950)—the tendency of surfaces to appear steeper than 
they are. Bridgeman and Hoover (2008) have recently demonstrated, for 
example, that farther portions of hills appear steeper than nearer portions— 
arguing that this is partly because the visual information available to see the 
slopes as departing from vertical becomes weaker with distance. We conducted 
an experiment seeking to demonstrate that a fairly steep hill (of about 20 
degrees) would appear steeper when viewed monocularly than when viewed 
binocularly. We had observed the effect ourselves. The effect is well known for 
small texture-defined surfaces viewed through an aperture (e.g., Gibson and 
Cornsweet 1952), and we sought to document it for large locomotor surfaces. 
When we closed an eye and looked straight ahead at the 20-degree hill it 
appeared to us about 60–70 degrees. With both eyes open it looked about 40 
degrees to us (slope overestimation is a typical and persistent finding).
The participants for our study met us near a campus field house. They were then 
blindfolded and led to one of two grass-covered hills. There they stood between 
two barriers that blocked any side view of the hill and were allowed to look 
straight at the hill with either one or two eyes. A cluster of small white stones 
placed on the hill at approximately eye level served as a fixation mark. Our 
instructions were clear. We made them read a statement explaining that we 
wanted them to tell us how things looked, not how they believed them to be. We 
went over the instruction again orally—we emphasized the importance of them 
reporting their perceptual experience. We even had them use a palm board first 
—a board that is suspended on a horizontal axis and can be set to any 
orientation—because using palm boards avoids some of the numeric bias effects 
that go with verbal estimates. The (unseen) palm board estimate having been 
recorded, each participant then made a verbal judgment of the apparent slope of 
the hill. We then blindfolded them again, led them to the other of the two hills 
and had them make the same pair of judgments (palm board match and verbal 
estimate) in the other viewing condition (monocular if they were binocular at 
first, or binocular if they had been monocular).
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We assumed that every participant would have about the same experience that 
we had. We knew that they would be suspicious and that they might be reluctant 
to get things wrong, but we still expected some small effect to be evident in their 
judgments. As we collected more and more data, it was stunning to see that 
there was no obvious effect. Contrary to our expectation, some people gave 
slope estimates that were higher in the binocular condition than in the 
monocular condition. In most cases, there was very little difference between the 
two conditions in either the palm board data or in the verbal reports. We knew 
we were in a deep and disturbing kind of methodological vortex, however, when 
a student who had just given verbal estimates that differed by only 5 degrees in 
the two conditions, turned to one of us as he was leaving at the conclusion of the 
experiment and said (sincerely, it seemed): “It’s a really big effect isn’t it!” He 
had seen it too, but his numeric estimates certainly made this hard to know.
In the end we tested twenty-six participants, dividing them roughly evenly 
across which hill they saw first (one hill was 18.5 degrees, the other was 21.5 
degrees) and whether they saw it binocularly or monocularly. Overall, if we look 
at both judgments of both slopes  (p.93) from each participant (i.e., attempt to 
measure the effect within-subjects), our average palm board matches were 31.9 
degrees (monocular) and 31.1 degrees (binocular), and our average verbal 
judgments were 45.7 degrees and 42.8 degrees, which were not reliably 
different from each other, t(26) ‹ 1.
By looking only at the first trial each participant engaged in, however, we might 
hope to see the unprotected perceptual error as a between-subject effect. 
Indeed, first-trial palm board estimates (mean = 33.3 degrees) in the monocular 
viewing condition were higher than first-trial palm board estimates in the 
binocular viewing condition (mean = 27.2 degrees), t(25) = 2.03, p = 0.027, one- 
tailed. The verbal estimates in the two conditions (50.0 degrees monocular and 
42.1 degrees binocular) were not reliably different from each other, t(25) = 1.40, 
p = 0.087, one-tailed, though they trended in the predicted direction.
We believe that even these between-subject comparisons understate the 
perceptual difference we observed. Thus even these judgments may reflect 
cognitive corrections for viewing state. The comparison of between-subject and 
within-subject differences suggests that in spite of our clear requests to these 
participants that they tell us about their perceptions, the apparent within- 
subjects constancy we measured across viewing states was due to strategic 
compensatory judgments. Our method, which used very similar slopes for both 
viewings, did nothing to prevent this. The idea that apparent constancy can 
come from cognitive corrections is well supported (Granrud 2009).
Experiment 2: Judgmental bias masquerading as perception
On the other hand, sometimes we can find differences in judgments that may not 
be perceptual. An exciting new form of ecological theory of surface perception 
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has been introduced by Proffitt and colleages (Bhalla and Proffitt 1999; Proffitt 
2006; Proffitt et al. 1995, 2003), suggesting that our perceptual experience has 
embedded in it aspects of our behavioral potential including our current 
physiological state. The new theory is exciting because it correctly notes that 
perceptions do not have to be geometrically accurate to be useful for planning 
actions. Moreover, it supposes, consistent with Milner and Goodale (1995), that 
much of what is evident in conscious perception is there for longer-term 
planning (in minutes or hours) whereas the online control of precise action 
might be guided by unconscious visual information (in seconds or less). The 
theory is supported by a variety of interesting results and paradigms that, 
together, point to a conscious visual experience that is richly textured by the 
intentions, attitudes, emotions, and energetics of the observer and the situation. 
From an evolutionary perspective, the intrusion of these sorts of information into 
one’s conscious visual awareness can be motivated because (a) it is only 
conscious experience (rather than motor control) that is affected, and (b) these 
kinds of considerations might well be desired to be integrated into our 
perceptual experience for the purposes of efficient (effortless) planning and 
decision making.
A drawback of the theory is that it suggests that violations of constancy are not 
only ubiquitous, but also variable, depending on many factors. This could make 
perceptual prediction processes difficult. Moreover, the theory seems to blur the 
distinction between  (p.94) perception and judgment. For example, in an 
extension to cognitive dissonance, participants required to wear a ridiculous 
costume while walking in a public space judged the distance of the space to be 
larger if they were paid well for their efforts than if they were not (Balcetis and 
Dunning 2007). Classically, such biasing of judgments in the cognitive 
dissonance literature is not always regarded as perceptual, but the new theory 
encourages judgments of this sort to be classified as perceptions. Although the 
boundary is not always clear, we suggest that a distinction between perceptual 
effects and effects on judgment may be reasonably sustained in many relevant 
cases.
Indeed, we will present evidence that experimental demand characteristics can 
influence perceptual judgments without necessarily reaching down into 
perceptual experience. This is not to argue that there are no cases where 
perceptions may be affected by intentions, emotions, or other extra-visual 
factors (e.g., Durgin and Gigone 2007; Durgin et al. 2005). It is likely, for 
example, that attentional factors can alter perceptual experience dramatically 
(Carrasco et al. 2004), and clearly physiological effects of age and fatigue, for 
example, may influence the quality of visual processing rather directly. Rather 
than doubting the possibility of perceptual effects, our immediate concern is 
with whether transient manipulations of such things as physical load (or 
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embarrassment, or what-have-you) actually affect the perception of distance and 
geographical slope rather than merely judgments concerning these perceptions.
One of the most interesting (and ultimately controversial) effects reported by 
Proffitt et al. (2003) was that distances appeared greater when wearing a heavy 
backpack. A number of labs immediately began playing with this effect, 
including ours, and found it difficult to replicate (Hutchison and Loomis 2006; 
Woods et al. 2009). In the published controversies about this effect, several 
further claims became established which appear to contradict either the 
evolutionary account above or to contradict the equation of judgment and 
perception. Specifically, although within-subject designs are decidedly more 
sensitive in the face of inter-subject variability, Proffitt et al. (2006) have argued 
that Hutchison and Loomis (2006) failed to detect the backpack effect with a 
within-subject design because the scaling applied to the participants’ 
perceptions in one condition would have carried over to the other. However, if 
participants can so easily undermine the alleged effect of the backpack, this 
would seem to undermine, in turn, the evolutionary value of the purported 
immediacy of these effects.
The claim that within-subject designs may introduce metacognitive 
contamination is not without merit on its own terms, as we have argued in the 
previous section, but it can only be supported insofar as a distinction is 
maintained between judgment and perception that is not maintained in the case 
of the cognitive dissonance results discussed above, for example. (Otherwise, we 
must conclude that backpacks really did not affect distance perception in the 
Hutchison and Loomis study, because they did not affect judgments.) This point 
aside, Proffitt et al. (2006) have correctly argued that whereas Hutchison and 
Loomis had failed to replicate the effect even with a between-subject design, the 
number of participants used in the experiment was less than that used by 
Proffitt et al. (2003), and the data appear to trend in the predicted direction. In 
other words, the failure to replicate in the between-subject version was 
inconclusive.
 (p.95) We set out to do the opposite of what Hutchison and Loomis had done. 
That is, rather than failing to replicate an experiment demonstrating a backpack 
effect on distance, we sought to experimentally produce a backpack effect. Our 
goal, however, was to test whether the effect of the backpack might be due to a 
judgmental bias in response to implicit demands of the experimental situation.
Demand characteristics of an experiment are the cues that participants receive 
as to what the experimental hypothesis might be (Orne 1959). The relationship 
between experimenter and participant is typically one in which participants 
perceive it to be their duty to help the experimenter by being cooperative. When 
participants receive cues as to how they are supposed to behave in an 
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experiment, they often will behave in a manner consistent with this demand 
character (Orne 1962).
To test whether backpacks impose an experimental demand in a backpack 
experiment we first administered a brief survey: Thirty-one Swarthmore College 
undergraduates enrolled in Introductory Psychology were given the survey after 
completing an unrelated experiment. In the survey, an experiment similar to that 
of Proffitt et al. (2003) was described in which an experimenter has participants 
wear a heavy backpack and make distance judgments (only the backpack 
condition was described). The question in the survey simply asked respondents 
to report what they thought the experimenter’s hypothesis was in the 
experiment just described; no alternatives were presented. Twenty (65%) 
respondents indicated that the experimenter hypothesized that the backpack 
would affect distance judgments, and of those respondents, sixteen (80%) 
described a hypothesis that involved distance judgments increasing as a result of 
wearing the backpack (the second most common hypothesis was simply that the 
backpack would in some way degrade performance). Thus, to the majority of our 
respondents, the experimental hypothesis actually entertained by Proffitt et al. 
(2003) was transparent, and it seems likely that for many of the participants in 
the original study, the hypothesis was similarly transparent.
The experiment we report here involved judgments of slope rather than 
distance, but the concerns are the same. Although effects of backpacks on 
perceptual judgments of slope have been reported (Bhalla and Proffitt 1999) and 
widely cited, we were surprised to learn that they had never been demonstrated 
in a controlled experiment. Instead, Bhalla and Proffitt measured slope 
perception in Introductory Psychology students who were all required to wear 
backpacks while making slope judgments. Bhalla and Proffitt then compared 
these judgments with previously published data they had collected with a 
different set of participants (passersby) in a different social context. Because 
their manipulation was not applied to equivalent groups, it was not a true 
experiment. Thus, the experiment we will describe here may be the first direct 
experimental test of the effect of backpacks on slope perception. We have 
subsequently replicated the result with a more sophisticated design by utilizing 
a post-experiment questionnaire (Durgin et al. 2009).
Crucially, we used three between-subject conditions in our experiment, rather 
than two, because it was essential to our design that we manipulate the 
presence or absence of an experimental demand as well as the presence or 
absence of a heavy backpack. Our participants were randomly assigned to 
conditions. In the Baseline condition, participants made slope judgments without 
any backpack. In the Standard Backpack condition,  (p.96) participants made 
slope judgments while wearing a heavy backpack. In the Control for Demand 
condition, participants wore the same heavy backpack while making slope 
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judgments, but were first given a plausible explanation for the backpack that 
was intended to remove the experimental demand.
To create a plausible explanation for the requirement to wear a heavy backpack, 
the experiment was done in an immersive virtual reality and the backpack was 
described as containing equipment crucial for the head-mounted display (HMD) 
that the participants all wore. Indeed, in the Control condition, the video 
processor for the HMD was carried in the backpack (along with several heavy 
weights), and the cables between the processor and the HMD were made to 
appear short so that wearing the backpack seemed necessary for wearing the 
HMD. To further provide participants with an alternative hypothesis about the 
purpose of the experiment, we showed them simulated slopes composed of two 
different types of texture.
Whereas Bhalla and Proffitt (1999) asked participants their weight and set the 
backpack weight to be 1/6–1/5 of this, we did not want to call attention to weight 
in the low-demand condition, so we used a standard backpack weight of 25 lb 
(11.3 kg) for all participants. In the previous semester, while conducting a pilot 
experiment, we had determined that this weight was at least 1/6 of the weight of 
94% of the female participants in our participant pool. Our recruitment strategy 
involved inviting randomly selected females from the Introductory Psychology 
pool to participate for credit. The women recruited did not know that they were 
selected for gender. Thirty female undergraduates students were divided evenly 
among the three conditions (two additional participants were excluded for 
failing to follow instructions).
Bhalla and Proffitt (1999) used only two slopes and collected three types of 
measure for each (verbal estimates, visual estimates using an adjustable two- 
dimensional angle representation, and an unseen hand-manipulated palm 
board). They reported that the backpack affected verbal estimates for the lower 
(5-degree) hill, and visual estimates for both (5 degrees and 31 degrees), but did 
not affect palm board estimates for either. Proffitt et al. (1995) have shown that 
visual and verbal measures tend to measure the same things. We used a verbal 
measure as well as a haptic matching task (palm board).
There were three between-subject conditions. In the Baseline condition, no 
backpack was worn. In the Control for Demand condition, subjects wore a heavy 
backpack that was described as containing the video apparatus for the HMD (it 
did contain the 3.1 kg apparatus, along with an additional 8.2 kg of weights); 
long cables ran into it from a computer and other short cables ran from it to the 
HMD. In the Standard condition, the backpack contained only weights (11.3 kg), 
and no explanation was given for why it had to be worn; the video processor was 
placed on a nearby surface, and several dumbbell-style weights were visible on 
another nearby surface to emphasize that weights were being used.
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The apparent experimental manipulation (to help with the deception) was that 
different textures were used to cover the slopes in the virtual environment. Four 
slopes were tested in the main experiment, from shallow (7 degrees) to steep (28 
degrees) by steps of 7 degrees, and each slope was shown using two different 
textures, one of which was the  (p.97) primary texture, having well-defined 
texels, and the other a more abstract “grassy” texture. Prior to these 
measurements, there were five practice trials used to camouflage the limited 
number of actual angles tested and to allow students to get used to the different 
textures. The first slope presented was always in the primary texture type and at 
the center of the range of slopes to be presented (i.e., 17.5 degrees). There 
followed four additional practice trials that varied in texture and presented 
slopes that were both higher than 28 degrees and lower than 7 degrees so as to 
render the experimental range a subset of the range seen. After five practice 
trials and eight randomly ordered experimental trials, the four slopes were again 
presented in the primary texture (in random order) for the haptic response. 
Thus, participants completed a total of seventeen trials (thirteen verbal and four 
haptic).
The stimuli were presented stereoscopically in an nVis HMD with a nominal 60- 
degree diagonal field of view (approximately 39 degrees vertical and 49 degrees 
horizontal). A HiBall optical head-tracker provided sub-mm precision at 120 Hz. 
The scene was viewed from eye-height in stereo (using the participant’s 
measured pupillary separation) rendered and displayed at 60 Hz with 1280 × 
1024-pixel resolution using custom OpenGL software. The display was 
immersive and compensated for all head-movements, corrected to eye position. 
The total lag was less than 50 milliseconds. The orientation of a rigid plastic 
palm board, mounted on a tripod at about chest level, was monitored by a 
second HiBall tracker. The palm board was placed higher than in Proffitt et al. 
(1995) because in this raised position it was easier to manipulate (He et al. 
2007); the HMD ensured the palm board could not be seen.
Each virtual hill presented in the experiment was defined as a planar surface 
that extended above the line of sight of the observer and extended to the left and 
right farther than the observer could see. The hill surface smoothly curved over 
a meter of surface into the simulated ground surface on which the participants 
stood. To prevent inspection of the cross-section of the hill, observers viewed the 
hill through a virtual doorway that obstructed their view of the hill beyond 
approximately 54 degrees of azimuth to the left and right. The participant stood 
4.5 ± 0.5 m from the base of the hill, behind and between two virtual walls. The 
walls were 8 m high, 0.25 m deep, and were positioned 2 m in front and 2 m to 
the side of where participants stood. The height of the hill was always higher 
than eye-height and was varied so that the angle of gaze to the top of the hill did 
not vary consistently with hill slope.
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Because the field of view inside the HMD was limited, participants were 
instructed during the first practice trial to look to the left and right before 
making their judgments to get a better sense of the spatial layout. They were 
also encouraged to look at the ground to their left and right to help stabilize 
their sense of what a horizontal surface looked like. Normally this information 
would be present in peripheral vision.
Finally, the participant was asked to provide a verbal estimate of the slope of the 
hill in degrees. This number was entered by the experimenter, and the virtual 
world went blank for about a second before the next hill was presented. After 
the thirteen verbal trials were completed, the experimenter explained the use of 
the (unseen) palm board and had the  (p.98) participant reach out to it. The 
participants, who were encouraged to explore the hill visually as before, then 
adjusted the palm board and indicated when they felt that it was parallel with 
the slope of the hill. The final position was recorded. After four palm-board trials 
(all with the primary texture on the surface), the HMD was removed and the 
experimenter fully debriefed the participants. The entire procedure took about 
20 minutes.
A graph of the mean verbal estimates and palm board estimates for each of the 
three conditions is shown in Figure 4.1. The verbal means for the Baseline, 
Control, and Standard conditions were, respectively, 29.3 ± 15 degrees, 28.5 ± 
5.2 degrees, and 36.7 ± 8.7 degrees. Consistent with the demand hypothesis, 
verbal estimates in the Standard condition were reliably greater than those in 
the Control condition, t(18) = 2.578, p = 0.019. That is, when the backpack was 
worn as part of the experiment (without explanation), slopes were judged 
reliably steeper than when the same weighted backpack was worn (and 
described) as an incidental part of the apparatus. Consistent with the report of 
Bhalla and Proffitt (1999) there was no effect of condition on the palm board 
settings (but see Durgin et al. 2010).
So do heavy backpacks affect the perception of slope, or only the estimates of 
the participants? Having conducted a true experiment on the effects of wearing 
a backpack on
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Fig. 4.1  Mean slope estimates in 
Experiment 2, in which virtual slopes 
were judged by three groups of 
participants who either wore no backpack 
(Baseline), wore a heavy backpack that 
was explained as part of the video 
processing apparatus for the head 
mounted display (Control for Demand) or 
wore a heavy backpack simply at the 
request of the experimenter while making 
the judgments (Standard Backpack).
 (p.99) slope judgments, we find 
that the experimental demand 
posed by the backpack in the 
Standard condition is sufficient to 
produce an effect on verbal 
judgments (though not on haptic 
slope matches). The effect is of the 
magnitude reported by Bhalla and 
Proffitt (1999). We can conclude 
that the effect on verbal 
judgments is due to experimental 
demand (and thus most likely an 
effect on judgment, not 
perception) rather than the weight 
of the backpack, because we have 
a control condition in which the 
same backpack is worn, but a 
plausible explanation is provided 
for wearing it.
Based on our data, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that 
effects of backpacks on 
perceptual judgments are due 
to cognitive biases induced by 
the social context of the 
experiment rather than effort- 
based changes in perception. Notice that because we have replicated the result 
reported by Bhalla and Proffitt (1999) and shown that it depends on demand 
characteristics, the details of our implementation of the experiment are not 
really at issue. Unlike studies that have failed to replicate backpack effects on 
distance (Hutchison and Loomis 2006; Woods et al. 2009), our goal has not been 
to argue that there are no effects of backpacks, but to show that the effects that 
have been reported so far are probably due to social influences on judgment 
rather than physiological influences on perceptual experience. In subsequent 
investigations, we have found that a “compliant” subset of participants drive the 
effect: they give high slope estimates, are able to articulate the hypothesis 
afterward, and also state that they believe they were affected (Durgin et al. 
2009). If they had been affected perceptually, they should have no way of 
knowing they had been affected.
If perceptual experiences reflect perceptual prediction, as has been argued for 
self-motion perception (Durgin 2009), then perceptual experience had better not 
be arbitrarily plastic. Effort theorists have tended to sidestep this concern by 
appealing to Milner and Goodale’s (1995) separation of vision for action and 
vision for perception (e.g., Proffitt 2006). They describe palm boards as action 
measures. But the claim that, for example, palm board measures are “action 
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measures” (Bhalla and Proffitt 1999) has little to recommend it; adjusting the 
consciously-perceived haptic orientation of a palm board by hand has no evident 
relationship to the motor action of stepping onto a hill (see Durgin et al. 2010). 
We suggest that palm board measures are simply less affected by judgmental 
biases (though they may still suffer from them)—as was also evident in 
Experiment 1. Our data support the conservative view that perceptual 
experience is probably not as subject to fluctuation as the effort theorists have 
argued. That is, whereas perceptual judgments (especially from memory) are 
subject to vagaries of social expectation and cognitive dissonance, there seems 
to be little evidence that perceptual experience is affected by transitory burdens.
Conclusion: Downhill from here
When is perceptual constancy important? Li and Durgin (2009) have recently 
observed a striking apparent failure of constancy in the perception of downhill 
slopes: For hills or even small ramps viewed from the top, perceived slope is 
much steeper if one stands back from the edge of the hill so that one’s incident 
gaze is nearly parallel with the sloped surface. This means that if one 
approaches a steep (e.g., 20-degree) downhill slope from the  (p.100) level 
ground above it, the hill surface initially appears particularly steep, but then 
grows visibly shallower as one nears the edge. The same effect can be observed 
when approaching a flight of stairs. What was most striking to us in this 
discovery, however, was that we had to look for it, and that no one else seems to 
have reported it before.
Whereas others have argued that downhill slopes are judged steeper than uphill 
slopes (Proffitt et al. 1995), we would now argue that there is no unique value 
for perceived slope from the top of a hill. It depends on where you stand. We 
discovered this because we wondered whether aiming one’s gaze down along a 
hill would help one to see the true orientation of the hill. This led us to explore 
viewing positions that were different distances from the edge and to notice that 
the apparent slope of the hill seemed even steeper (and therefore less accurate) 
as we stood a few steps back. We have found that this can be quantitatively 
modeled by a combination of proprioceptive error regarding gaze direction and 
logarithmic coding of optical slant (surface slant relative to gaze orientation). We 
have also found that the proprioceptive perception of head pitch (even with 
closed eyes) is greatly exaggerated (Li and Durgin 2009).
How can such a failure of orientation constancy go unnoticed in daily life? Our 
argument here is that the experience of virtual perceptual constancy sometimes 
depends on the predictability of the perceptual consequences of our actions. 
Much as we seldom notice the optic flow of the environment as we move—it is 
expected—even large fluctuations in apparent surface orientation may be 
unremarkable to us. Future work can seek to determine whether, in this 
particular case, this is because these apparent deformations are predictable 
perceptual consequences of our actions (Durgin et al. 2007b), as seems to be the 
Constant Enough: On the Kinds of Perceptual Constancy Worth Having
Page 17 of 20
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 
2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.  
Subscriber: Swarthmore College; date: 12 August 2020
case for the optic flow of the ground plane (Durgin et al. 2005; Durgin 2009), or 
because our own self-motion often masks apparent object rotations anyway 
(Wallach et al. 1974).
Throughout this paper we have sought to support the notion that there are 
perceptual facts that are distinct from judgments we make about them and we 
have pointed to correspondences as well as discrepancies between introspective 
experience and measurable performance. As an example of a correspondence, 
we reviewed evidence that motion parallax does not seem to support the 
perception of empty space in the same way that binocular strereopsis does at 
intermediate distances. In Experiment 1, we suggested that real perceptual 
differences in surface slope were being masked by metacognitive strategies that 
produced null effects in within-subject comparisons. Between-subject 
comparisons revealed the predicted (and probably real) perceptual differences 
in slope perception for monocular viewing compared to binocular viewing, 
though likely underestimated them. These differences corresponded 
qualitatively with our own subjective impressions. With Experiment 2, however, 
we argued that judgmental biases rather than perceptual differences were 
responsible for the effects of backpacks on judgments of slope. When a heavy 
backpack was worn in a context that licensed the implication that the backpack 
was intended to affect slope judgments, slope estimates were higher than when 
the same heavy backpack was worn in a context that removed this demand 
character of the experimental context.
 (p.101) Whereas traditional constancy research has often confounded 
metacognitive judgments and perceptual experience, Granrud’s (2009) work 
suggests that underconstancy is more the rule than the exception when 
metacognition is directly assessed. Here we have advanced the notion that 
stable underconstancy may be functional in supporting the guidance and control 
of action because it preserves the structured correlations (such as between self- 
motion and perceived optic flow) that can be used to tune perception most 
precisely for the control of action (Durgin 2009; Durgin et al. 2010).
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